On 30 September 2026, several stations in Greater Libreville had run out of diesel. On 5 October in Brazzaville, the Prime Minister described the shortage as "particularly worrying". In Bamako, the water company had to buy its own fuel to keep pumping. Earlier in the year, in March, queues in Bamako stretched for two to three kilometres, and petrol sold on Conakry's black market for more than 20,000 Guinean francs a litre, almost twice the official price.
These shortages are not accidents. They have known causes, a measurable cost, and solutions that can be costed. Here are all three, in that order.
What a shortage costs
Budgets bleed. Gabon paid 30 billion CFA francs in fuel subsidies for September 2026 alone. In Senegal, diesel sold at 755 CFA francs a litre since August cost 1,044 CFA francs according to the authorities: the state pays 289 CFA francs on every litre. Congo's petroleum import bill jumped 106.1% in the first quarter of 2026, to 39.5 billion CFA francs. Cameroon, which has no refinery, spent 274.3 billion CFA francs over the same quarter.
Prices soar away from the ports. In March 2026, diesel was fixed at 940 CFA francs a litre in Bamako but sold for 1,250 to 2,500 CFA francs in central and northern Mali. In April it reached 3.1 dollars a litre in Kolwezi, Likasi and Lubumbashi. Since March, the Bisie tin mine in eastern DR Congo has been buying part of its fuel at premiums of 25% to 35%.
Power and water stop. A large share of the region's electricity comes from plants burning heavy fuel oil or diesel: 82% in Cabo Verde in 2021. After the Kaloum depot explosion in December 2023, Guinea requisitioned mining companies' stocks to keep Électricité de Guinée running, and the Dinguiraye mine stopped for lack of fuel oil. In Bamako in May 2026, some districts had up to 18 hours of power cuts a day, and SOMAGEP's pumping stations at Kabala, Djicoroni Para, Kalabanbougou and Missabougou went down with the grid.
Factories and schools close. In Cameroon, the new Figuil cement plant stopped in June 2026 for lack of electricity. From 27 October to 9 November 2025, Mali suspended classes in all its schools and universities.
Quality falls. The black market issues no certificate of analysis. Adulterated or badly stored diesel damages engines, a cost that only shows up later.
The causes
1. We import what we could refine
According to ECOWAS, West Africa imports about 75% of its petroleum products, and its refineries run at yields below 30%. The paradox is harsher in oil-producing countries. Congo exports its crude, but its refinery, CORAF, had been in a technical shutdown since 8 September 2026, and the number of crude lots allocated to it fell from four to three; "the big problem remains the real cost of imports", the Prime Minister acknowledged. In Gabon, the Sogara refinery processes about 0.86 million tonnes a year against a capacity of 1.2 million, for lack of crude, which operators prefer to export. Cameroon has had no refinery since the SONARA fire in 2019.
Even when fuel is refined next door, it slips away. Nigeria's Dangote refinery has run at full capacity since February 2026: 650,000 barrels a day. In March it sold twelve petrol cargoes, 456,000 tonnes, bound for Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Ghana, Togo and Tanzania. Large international traders lifted them; back in 2024, Vitol, Trafigura and BP were already lifting most of its loadings, according to Bloomberg.
2. Stocks counted in days
The International Energy Agency recommends the equivalent of 90 days of net imports. The European Union requires the higher of 90 days of imports or 61 days of consumption. Here, we count in days. In Gabon, average cover for white products at Owendo was 16 days in 2025; in early October 2026, the first half of an 8,000-tonne petrol cargo was expected to cover six days of consumption.
Mali decreed a 45-day national security stock in April 2026. On 20 September 2026, the depots surveyed held 10.2 million litres of diesel and 10.1 million litres of petrol. Against the 2.665 billion litres imported in 2024, or 7.3 million litres a day, that is less than three days of consumption.
3. Stocks far from those who burn them
The big depots are on the coast, because that is where ships arrive. Mines, power plants and inland cities are hundreds of kilometres away, at the end of roads that can be cut. That distance is what northern Mali, the Congolese Copperbelt and the Bisie mine pay for. In late September 2026, petrol ran short in Kédougou, at the heart of Senegal's mining region.
4. The road cut
Mali has neither a refinery nor a coastline: all its fuel arrives by road tanker. In early September 2025, the JNIM announced a blockade on fuel imports. According to the Institute for Security Studies, more than 300 tankers had been destroyed by June 2026. Convoys now travel under military escort, whose cost rose from 600,000 to 800,000 CFA francs per convoy.
5. The distant shock
On 28 February 2026, the Strait of Hormuz was largely blocked, and Brent climbed to 126 dollars a barrel in March. For countries that import their refined fuel, a price shock quickly becomes a supply shock: cargoes become dearer and scarcer, and importers hesitate.
6. Prices that do not cover costs
When the pump price is below cost and the gap is paid late, the importer loses money on every cargo and slows down. In Congo, the Prime Minister himself linked the shortages to the limited finances of SNPC, the main importer.
7. Fear and speculation
In Conakry in March 2026, the national oil company said stocks covered the country's needs; queues formed anyway. In Bamako, the Minister of Industry accused operators of speculating and capped sales at 600 litres per truck for 72 hours. Without public figures, rumour makes the shortage.
The solutions
Buy African, and buy together. Dangote sells its export cargoes to the big traders because they pay cash or against bank guarantees and lift regular volumes. ECOWAS, or a group of states, can offer the same: an annual offtake contract for part of the output, priced on a formula, guaranteed by Afreximbank and BOAD, with a guaranteed-delivery clause and back-up suppliers so that one dependence is not swapped for another. The harmonisation of fuel specifications that ECOWAS began in 2020 also needs finishing.
Grow African trading champions. Reserve part of national tenders, 20% to 30% for example, for qualified African traders competing on the same terms as everyone else; cover part of the risk on their letters of credit through guarantee funds; pay them to hold part of the mandatory stocks. A public list of approved operators keeps out middlemen with no substance. No guaranteed margin, no exclusive licence: access.
Refine our crude before exporting it. Congo, Gabon and Cameroon can send part of the state's share of crude to a refinery in the region in exchange for finished products. Existing refineries need the crude they require, as Congo is considering for CORAF, with private partners bound by performance contracts.
Create a regional strategic reserve. A shared reserve, spread between the main ports from Dakar to Lagos and the landlocked countries themselves, partly supplied by the Dangote contract. It is funded first by part of the subsidies already being paid and by regional banks, EBID, BOAD and Afreximbank, without touching pump prices. Its golden rule: automatic release, run by a neutral operator, that no sanction or political dispute can block. On that condition the Sahel states of the AES will join. ECOWAS has already done this for cereals with its Regional Food Security Reserve; CEMAC can build its own.
Require stocks in every country. Thirty days with licensed distributors, thirty days of public reserve, ninety for landlocked countries, checked every month and published every week. Mali's April 2026 decree shows the way: private operators may hold up to half of the security stock, which is funded by two earmarked levies.
Build a network of inland depots. Depots no more than a day's drive from the main mining, industrial and urban areas, sited in secure zones, resupplied continuously by road tankers under coordinated escort, and by rail or pipeline where they exist, such as Tazama between Dar es Salaam and Zambia. Burkina Faso, with the Péni depot, and Côte d'Ivoire, with Yamoussoukro, have shown it can be done. Private operators can build them, open them to all at a regulated tariff and finance them through capacity contracts signed by mines, power producers and distributors.
Protect power and water. Every thermal power plant and every water utility should hold thirty days of fuel, with a delivery priority written down before the crisis. And burn less fuel oil: dual-fuel plants, solar and batteries for pumping stations, regional interconnections.
Finance, pay, publish. Open to licensed private importers the credit lines that regional banks already know how to grant; develop inventory finance, common for cocoa and cotton, for fuel held in bonded storage; pay compensation on fixed dates; retain several suppliers and several origins in every tender; publish national stocks every week in days of consumption.
Five costed pilot projects
Our estimates rest on three ratios taken from public figures. Storage: the Péni depot, 104,000 cubic metres, cost about 32 billion CFA francs, or about 310,000 CFA francs per cubic metre. Product: in September 2026, BOAD lent 8 billion CFA francs to import about 20 million litres into Mali, or about 400 CFA francs per litre imported. Density: about 0.745 kg per litre for petrol. These are orders of magnitude, not quotes.
Pilot 1: thirty days of petrol for Gabon
Gabon consumes about 708,000 litres of petrol a day, according to SGEPP. Thirty days is about 21.2 million litres, or 21,200 cubic metres.
| Item | Calculation | Estimated amount |
|---|---|---|
| Product | 21.2 million litres x 400 CFA francs | about 8.5 billion CFA francs |
| Tanks | 21,200 m³ x 310,000 CFA francs | about 6.5 billion CFA francs |
| Total | about 15 billion CFA francs |
That is half of the 30 billion CFA francs of subsidies paid in September 2026 alone, without a franc more at the pump.
Pilot 2: making Mali's 45-day stock real
At the 2024 pace of 7.3 million litres a day, 45 days is about 329 million litres, or 329,000 cubic metres, more than three times the Péni depot.
| Stage | Volume | Product | Tanks | Estimated total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First tranche, 15 days | 110 million litres | about 44 billion CFA francs | about 34 billion CFA francs | about 78 billion CFA francs |
| Full stock, 45 days | 329 million litres | about 131 billion CFA francs | about 101 billion CFA francs | about 232 billion CFA francs |
The first tranche is roughly one depot the size of Péni. Mali's decree lets private operators carry half of it, and loans like BOAD's to SOTRAKA show that regional financing exists.
Pilot 3: a regional contract with Dangote
A Dangote petrol cargo weighs 38,000 tonnes on average: March's 456,000 tonnes divided by twelve. That is about 51 million litres, or around 20 billion CFA francs at the ratio used. A regional contract for one cargo a month, guaranteed by Afreximbank and BOAD, would cover 456,000 tonnes a year, as much as traders lifted in March alone. Afreximbank already knows the refinery: it underwrote 2.5 billion dollars of its 4 billion dollar syndicated loan in March 2026.
Pilot 4: a first inland depot near a mining area
A 20,000 cubic metre tank, the size of the latest tank commissioned at Yamoussoukro in July 2026, would cost about 6.2 billion CFA francs at the Péni ratio. It holds 20 million litres, as much as all the diesel and petrol counted in Mali's depots on 20 September 2026. Financed by capacity contracts with the mines and power plants of its area, it does not weigh on the state budget.
Pilot 5: one country to lead by example
A volunteer state brings all of this together on its territory from 2027: thirty days of reserve for its power plants and water utility, a first inland depot, part of its tenders open to qualified African traders, and a contract with Dangote. Nothing will convince its neighbours better than a country that lacks nothing in the next crisis.
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Country by country: where things stand at the end of October 2026
The causes differ from one country to the next, and so do the answers. Here is the picture, from published facts.
| Country | What is happening | Main cause |
|---|---|---|
| Malawi | Queues lasting days at filling stations in October 2026 | Lack of dollars: according to an IMF report, international banks stopped confirming the country's letters of credit; tobacco earnings fell from 500.4 to 282.5 million dollars over the first 19 weeks of the year |
| Niger | Order of 12 October 2026 banning exports of diesel and petrol, queues in Niamey | A 52.6 million litre diesel deficit over the first eight months of 2026, according to the energy ministry |
| Chad | Product leaving the Djarmaya refinery, the country's only one, at its lowest of the year in August 2026 | Dependence on a single refinery; in 2023 a 45-day maintenance shutdown had already caused long queues in N'Djamena |
| Mali | Fuel moving in escorted convoys for more than a year | Blockade of supply routes |
| Gabon | Six days of petrol cover in early October 2026 | Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz and weaknesses in the national supply system, according to the Council of Ministers |
| Congo | Diesel shortage in Brazzaville | CORAF refinery shut since 8 September 2026 |
| Botswana | Strategic reserves of 13.9 days in November 2025, against 18 considered necessary | Dependence on South Africa for 60 to 67 % of supply |
| Madagascar | Power deficit up from 12 to 25 MW between 21 and 22 October 2026 | Thermal plants short of diesel; JIRAMA now imports 63 million litres directly |
These situations fall into four families, each with its own answer.
Currency (Malawi). The fuel exists, but the country can no longer pay for it. The answer lies in trade finance mechanisms and in those who earn dollars: we cover them in dollar shortage: how to pay for and secure fuel imports.
Failing local refining (Chad, Congo, Gabon). A country relying on one refinery runs short of everything the day it stops. The answer: import contracts ready to take over, and stocks covering at least the length of a technical shutdown.
The road (Mali, Niger). When the corridor closes or a country holds back its own fuel, the answer is a forward stock close to consumers and a fallback corridor written into the contract.
Reserves that are too short (Botswana, Gabon). A few days of stock leave no margin. Botswana plans a 187 million litre depot at Tshele Hills to reach 60 days by 2035; Mali has set a 45-day national stock. We did the calculation for a single site in diesel buffer stock on site: how many days.
For companies and remote sites
A buffer stock on site. A few weeks of consumption in a tank absorbs a delayed convoy or a cut road. For a mine or a power plant, it is the cheapest insurance.
A contract rather than day-to-day buying. A stated monthly volume, a known price formula and a delivery schedule: the supplier reserves the product, and you go ahead of the day's buyers.
A fall-back origin. A contract that names two loading ports keeps delivering when one corridor closes.
Quality control. In a shortage more than ever, require the certificate of analysis for every batch and have large volumes tested.
Our reading
Africa does not lack oil. It lacks refining that serves its own markets, reserves, and tanks in the right places. The figures show it: a thirty-day petrol reserve in Gabon would cost half of one month of subsidies. Security costs less than crisis. The private sector is ready to invest in depots, trucks and stocks; it asks for clear rules, payments made on time and access to finance.
Frequently asked questions
Why does Africa run short of fuel when it produces oil?
Because most countries export their crude and import refined fuel. West Africa imports about 75% of its petroleum products, according to ECOWAS. In Congo and Gabon refineries lack crude; Cameroon has had no refinery since 2019.
What is a strategic fuel reserve?
A stock that the state, or a regional body, releases only in a crisis. The International Energy Agency recommends the equivalent of 90 days of imports; Mali decreed 45 days of consumption in April 2026.
How much does a fuel reserve cost?
In Gabon, thirty days of petrol, tanks included, would cost about 15 billion CFA francs by our estimate, based on the cost of the Péni depot and the implicit price of a BOAD loan. That is half of the subsidies Gabon paid in September 2026.
Why is there a fuel shortage in Malawi?
Because of a lack of dollars to pay for imports: tobacco earnings fell sharply in 2026, and international banks stopped confirming the country's letters of credit, according to an IMF report.
Why did Niger ban fuel exports?
To keep its product in the face of a 52.6 million litre diesel deficit over the first eight months of 2026, according to the energy ministry. The order dates from 12 October 2026.
Why is there a fuel shortage in Mali?
Because the JNIM declared a blockade on fuel imports in September 2025 and attacks tanker convoys. Mali has neither a refinery nor a coastline, and its depots held less than three days of consumption on 20 September 2026.
Why is there a diesel shortage in Congo-Brazzaville?
The CORAF refinery had been in a technical shutdown since 8 September 2026, and SNPC's limited finances complicate imports, according to the Prime Minister.
What we do
GraceRoad delivers certified diesel and petrol from our own depots or those of our partners in Dakar, Abidjan, Lomé or Cotonou, depending on availability, by tracked road tanker to your site. For more distant ports, we deliver by sea directly to the port, from 2,000 tonnes, priced on the international quotation plus a stated premium, with a certificate of analysis for every batch. We help remote sites size their buffer stock and plan deliveries ahead.
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Read also: fuel storage in West Africa, shipping to Mali under blockade, Gabon's fuel shortage and fuel trading explained.
Sources: ECOWAS energy ministers' meeting, February 2020, via Sidwaya (75% imports, refinery yields); Les Dépêches de Brazzaville, 5 October 2026, via allAfrica (CORAF, crude lots, SNPC, Prime Minister); Ecomatin, 2026 (Congo import bill, Sogara); Investir au Cameroun, 2026 (Cameroon imports); Gabon Media Time, Gabonactu and L'Union, October 2026 (shortage, 708,000 litres a day, six days of cover); SGEPP, 2025 (16 days of cover); Africa24, October 2026 (30 billion CFA francs of subsidies); Dakaractu, Le360 and Hespress, August 2026 (real cost of diesel in Senegal); Sikafinance and APAnews, March 2026 (prices in Mali); SMM, 20 April 2026 (prices in DR Congo); Mining Weekly, 29 April 2026 (Alphamin); Forbes Africa Lusófona (Cabo Verde); Afrik.com (Guinea, requisition, Dinguiraye); allAfrica, January 2024 (Kaloum); Koaci, 12 May 2026, and Journal du Mali, 22 May 2026 (power cuts, SOMAGEP); Koaci, 11 June 2026 (Figuil); Africanews, 27 October 2025 (school closures); Africanews and allAfrica, 23 March 2026 (Dangote cargoes); BusinessDay, 7 November 2024, citing Bloomberg (Dangote buyers); Afreximbank, March 2026 (syndicated loan); International Energy Agency and Directive 2009/119/EC (90 and 61 days); Official Journal of Mali, 2026, no. 7 (national security stock); APA and Mali's Ministry of Economy and Finance (2,665,106 m³ imported in 2024; stocks on 20 September 2026); Financial Afrik, 28 September 2026 (BOAD loan to SOTRAKA); Sidwaya and Burkina 24 (Péni depot, 104,000 m³, about 32 billion CFA francs); Agence ivoirienne de presse, 24 July 2026 (Yamoussoukro depot); Institute for Security Studies, 4 June 2026 (tankers destroyed); Mondafrique, April 2026 (escort costs); Togo First, 27 May 2026 (Brent); Investigator Guinée and allAfrica, 3 March 2026 (Conakry); allAfrica, 13 March 2026 (600-litre cap); ECOWAS and Inter-réseaux (Regional Food Security Reserve). The pilot projects are the author's estimates based on these figures. For the country-by-country picture: allAfrica, 1 and 5 October 2026, and Forbes Africa, 23 October 2026 (Malawi, IMF report, tobacco earnings); AFP via Connaissance des énergies, 18 October 2026 (Niger, order of 12 October, 52.6 million litre deficit); Ecomatin, September 2026, and Tchadinfos, May 2023 (Djarmaya); Institute for Security Studies (Mali blockade); Gabon Council of Ministers final statement, 8 October 2026; Les Dépêches de Brazzaville, 5 October 2026 (CORAF); Botswana Daily News, November 2025, and Your Botswana (reserves, Tshele Hills); BusinessTech, citing the World Bank; Newsmada, 27 October 2026 (JIRAMA, deficit from 12 to 25 MW).
